AMERICA AFTER THE WAR

CHAPTER I

AMERICA AND THE WAR

When the national authorities acted, and America became a belligerent in one of the most stupendous wars in history, the duty of Americans to their country was clear: they were bound to sustain the successful prosecution of the war by every legitimate means in their power. Nevertheless, without impropriety they may continue to differ concerning the ends and the ultimate effects of the war on the future of the nation and on civi­lization in general. The right to free­dom of opinion does not, however, abro­gate the duty of an American not to em­barrass his Government by useless dis­cussion. No further debate, for exam­ple, concerning the propriety of a war is admissible in any orderly state after war is once duly declared. The laws which underlie national existence do not permit individual or domestic opposition to the national authority in time of war; but the liberty postulated of a republic does permit a reasonable discussion, in the abstract, of the future national prob­lems affected by the war.

All modern wars between nations are in the last analysis founded on national interest and national honor, which are al­most identical terms. Other causes may be assigned by political parties, and in popular governments other causes are often necessarily assigned when the cit­izenship is indifferent to the national honor or oblivious of the urgency of the paramount national interest. The United States had an ample casus belli on which to found a declaration of war against Germany. The conduct of Ger­many prior to 1917 had violated the prin­cipal laws of war (jura belli), to the great injury of the American nation. The wonder is that American politicians and even the national authorities so long absolutely ignored or tolerated what was generally apparent. But underneath all the causes avowed for America's en­tering the war lay that mainspring of na­tional action—the national safety and the national interest. Prior to 1914 it had long been foreseen by thoughtful men that America would sooner or later be obliged to enter into a war with Ger­many. The present time was certainly an opportune time for America to begin hostilities that were inevitable. Long anterior to the present war Germany was known to regard with invidious eyes this hemisphere, its institutions, its preten­sions, and its peculiar and phenomenal development. It should be confessed that America in the past has not been most favorably regarded by European governments. Between the political thought of Europe and the political thought of America lies a great abyss far deeper than the separating seas. Only time can satisfactorily bridge this chasm.

Between Germany and America in particular there has long been a latent misunderstanding. Since 1870, given an opportune moment, American inter­ests would have been unhesitatingly as­sailed by Germany with all the force and power it could command. For this reason, if for no other, it was the interest of the American Government to meet the inevitable issue with Germany at least as soon as it did, and it is its duty to wage the war with all the power and force it can command.

Some of the provocative causes ably stated by President Wilson in his ad­dress to Congress, April 2, 1917, and as­signed as reasons for the entrance of America into a foreign war, have not become of less moment now that America is at war. Their indirect purpose was the conviction of those Americans who think little concerning the laws which control the struggles for human and na­tional existence. That America was jus­tified in her declaration of war for many reasons not stated by the President the world in the end will concede. Her imperiled national interests alone af­forded ample justification for such a declaration. But in pragmatic England and in practical America political and national movements are singularly pro­moted by sentimental considerations, sometimes pertinent, at others irrele­vant, but always skillfully manipulated by those more discerning public men who have closer at heart the national interests and well-being, and who them­selves need no other incentive besides the national interests for even such an extreme action as public war.

For the honor of humanity it is sad to have to admit that sentiment of itself is never a valid reason of state for extreme national measures. In the minds of statesmen of any country sentiment is not the real reason for war, though it is often made use of by public men in order to influence some desired public action. Patriotism is not a sentiment. It is to belittle the nobility of mankind to affirm that the love of God, of family, of coun­try, of liberty, and of justice is a senti­ment. This natural affection is a priori and inborn; it is dictated by the sense of self-preservation; it is an elementary-principle of being. For country, family, and liberty men will fight until the end of time. In well-constructed human beings sentiment plays a minor part. At so grave a time as this Americans need no such artificial stimulus as sentiment to induce them to support their Govern­ment in an international issue involving the safety of their country, their fami­lies, and their liberty. As is the case with most abstractions, sentiment would not at any time be a safe criterion for public measures. It is as often ill founded as well founded, and conse­quently it is never a prudent or a de­liberate reason for the great finality of a nation. It is the national interest and honor alone which in the end control the external actions of a state. In any dis­cussion of the problems involved in this war, therefore, sentiment should be allowed to play only a minor part. Al­liances between nations are not deter­mined by considerations of sentiment. Common interests and advantages for the time being afford the sufficient in­ducement for either defensive or offen­sive alliances of nations.

Since the ascent of Prussia to the hegemony and direction of Germany, English public men have been with rea­son profoundly disturbed. They have seen with disquietude the long commer­cial supremacy of England challenged with effect by Germany; they have seen the colonial policy of England and the integrity of its widely extended empire frequently menaced by unmistakable overtures. Indeed, for the last fifty years thinking men in England and else­where have foreseen that a struggle be­tween the English and the German em­pires was inevitable. Men in both na­tions have long been shouting, "Delenda est Carthago!" to the increasing discom­fiture of the rest of the world. Both Germany and England have in their own way silently prepared for the struggle, indirectly by alliances and international conversations, and directly by increased armaments either on the land or on the sea. It would have been far better for the Entente Allies if England had not confined her preliminary preparations so largely to the seas. Her allies have been forced to bear the brunt of her over­sight. Indeed, it would have been far less costly to the British Empire itself had England's preparations on land kept better step with the pace of the Ger­man Empire. Mr. Lloyd George has lately admitted that England somewhat neglected the obvious duty to arm on land, and that the neglect would not occur again. England's excuse for neg­lect is no mystery. She used her na­tional resources the better to extend for the time being her challenged commercial supremacy.

In so far as America was concerned, England's increased armament was never disquieting. All the other ex­ternal actions of England were not, how­ever, so reassuring to America. Ante­rior to the War of 1914 many English statesmen endeavored to come to an un­derstanding with Germany. In such a possible understanding lurked the great­est peril to this country. As existing national alliances and ententes are very temporary, it is thought by some public men, even in England's own empire, that this country has not yet escaped all ulti­mate danger of such an association. Regardless of that now remote possibil­ity, the interest of America in the pres­ent conflict unquestionably lies with England and her allies. To aid France Cardinal Richelieu did not hesitate to promote Protestantism. He was a statesman of the first order. Any mina­tory combinations of the great powers which the future may unfold are too re­mote to furnish ground for any hesitancy on the part of America to coöperate heartily with England and her allies throughout the present war. Neverthe­less, the American aims in the final is­sues of the war are not and cannot be identical with the ends of England. In Asia their separate interests have of late widely diverged. It is reasonably clear that the pronounced aims of Mr. Lloyd George are not even now the aims of most of the other leading public men of England. It is therefore safe to predict that the program of Mr. Lloyd George will not be prominent in the final adjust­ments of the pending war by the powers. As to the respective merits of the two leading belligerents, England and Ger­many, in the War of 1914, America has not hesitated to form an opinion. Eng­land is a free and great country. Her public men are far more astute in the business of government than the German public men or any other public men. Even the English colonial empire, the duration of which is much involved in this war, has, since the independence of America, been admirably administered in the main, and the high commercial principles applied in colonial adminis­tration have produced good results. If we except the loss of liberty and inde­pendence of some of the subject popula­tions of England, there has been little to condemn in the English colonial system. In all her colonies England has had since 1783 more regard for justice and human rights than has ever been displayed by any other colonial system. It is this fact which has made the dependent status tolerable in the English colonies and dependencies, and in several in­stances even desirable for them. It is the general opinion in America that the colonial system of England has for a century been more nearly perfect than any other colonial system known to his­tory. There is not, however, a general consensus in America that the English colonial system either in India or Egypt is abstractly justifiable. But taking the English colonial system as it is, this country, as a whole, has not viewed with favor the desires of Germany to disrupt or partition it.

It is not extreme to affirm that the am­bition of Germany to enter the ranks of the great colonial powers has been con­templated with disfavor not only in America, but by the entire non-Germanic world. America in the main distrusts, with or without sound reason, all colo­nial systems whatever, but particularly the German. Of those existing it un­doubtedly favors the British. American sympathies with the colonial system of England have in the pending conflict been much promoted by the conviction that since 1914 the Germans have delib­erately violated the laws of war, labori­ously built up since the time of Grotius. The early attempt of England to starve by a new system of blockade the civilian population of Germany did not meet with prompt condemnation in America because of the coarse German methods of warfare and the instinctive conviction of Americans that Germany was as hos­tile to America as to England. It was foreseen from the outset that the War of 1914, beyond all other modern wars, was bound to be a war à outrance, and that American interests were likely to be gravely imperiled by the leading bellig­erents. The President and the present Government were evidently from the be­ginning deeply concerned, and they acted with caution and uniform discretion. As the sequel showed, their concern was well founded.

Americans are not a thoughtless peo­ple, and they are now beginning to think of the future, after the present war shall end. That the past alliances between nations have not been of long duration history demonstrates to them. At pres­ent America finds herself engaged on the side of four or five powers of the first rank; some of them have long been friendly to America, others not uni­formly so. The alliance, or, if pre­ferred, the present coordination, of America with the Entente powers, is en­tirely fortuitous; it is pursuant to no treaty, or even international conversa­tion. It is dictated, as all other inter­national arrangements and alliances have, in fact, been dictated, solely by the best interests for the time being and the supposed safety of the allied countries. All such alliances are at best but tem­porary. In the past England and France have more often been enemies than allies. In the more general con­flicts of the world America and England have heretofore been uniformly enemies. France and Russia have in turn been enemies and allies. Prussia and Eng­land have been both allies and enemies. France and Prussia have been allied against England, while Austria, France, and Russia have been allies against Eng­land and Prussia combined. The past combinations, indeed, have been very curious and inconsistent. In each in­stance the supposed interest of the allies alone governed. The course of history never stops. What has been will be again.

The inconsistent alliances between European coun­tries are enumerated by a recent French writer as follows:

The alliances of Burgundy and England against France, then of Burgundy and France against Eng­land; of France, Venice, and Turkey against Austria and Spain; of France, Saxony, and the Palatinate against Austria; of France, Sweden, and the Nether­lands against Spain and Austria; of France and Prussia against Austria and England, then of Aus­tria, France, Sweden, and Russia against Prussia and England; of France, Spain, and the United States against England; of all the nations of Europe against France; of France, England, and Piedmont against Russia; of France and Italy against Austria; the moral or immoral entente of Prussia, England, and France against Austria; alliance of Prussia and the North German States, morally aided by England, against France; of France and Russia against Ger­many, Austria, and Italy, with England in the back­ground; of Japan and England against Russia; in order to bring about the present combination, in which fabricators of empty phrases see the supreme struggle between "civilization" and "barbarism," but in which well-informed minds see only a new and intense form of a conflict of interests dividing Eu­rope and the world. [Translated from "Hier, Au­jourd'hui, Demain," p. 155, Bourassa.]

That the policy of America in the present war should be formulated by its statesmen, and not by its politicians, is evident. Statesmen govern a country with an eye to the future good of the na­tion. Politicians are mere opportunists. The difference between them is marked. Taking into consideration the brevity of all international alliances, the impera­tive duty of American statesmen is to make sure that in the course of a tem­porary alliance with European powers the best interests of the American na­tion are not imperiled. There are with the allies of America outstanding prob­lems of grave importance. Any error in regard to them will inflict untold mis­eries upon posterity. Most interna­tional alliances, while necessary, are full of ultimate dangers. For this reason European alliances have not been here­tofore favored in America. That they have now become necessary and must long continue is generally admitted, al­though it is a departure from an ancient tradition. Unintentionally, America has against her will at last been forced to enter a new and difficult foreign arena. The great question is, Will it adequately prepare for the new responsibilities which the entrance entails? If it does not, the future of America will be un­necessarily jeoparded, and the natural course of American history will be much influenced.

To the world in general the "United States" par excellence is known as "America." In the course of these pa­pers America has therefore been ac­cepted as the more familiar title of the United States. Only in some instances, where greater particularity was essen­tial to clarity, has the official designation been employed.