CHAPTER II
BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG
To enforce Belgian neutrality is not the primary reason why America engaged in the war against Germany, nor is the violation of the spirit of American democracy the real reason. The great injuries suffered by the Belgians in the present war have been deplored by Americans, who have done much to alleviate the plight of Belgium. Throughout their entire national existence Americans have evinced a marked sense of public justice; they have showed themselves to be in the main a just and kindly people. But as America was not a party to the neutralization of Belgium, it is doubtful whether an infraction of Belgian neutrality by any of the parties to the Neutrality Treaty of November 15, 1831, could by the law of nations be vindicated by America. This was obviously the conclusion at first reached at Washington. Americans could and did protest against the violation; but officially America had no standing to protest or to vindicate a treaty of neutralization to which America was not a party.
It is unfortunate that the state of political parties and the conditions of her parliamentary government did not permit England to act with more efficiency in the first days of the War of 1914. That the safety of Belgium was in the first instance adequately protected by any of the guarantors of her neutrality is not clear. The preliminary pourparlers in 1914 between England and Germany , when examined carefully, leave the impression that the English ministers did not insist firmly enough on the right of Belgium to immunity from invasion in the event of war. Up to July 31, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to the French representative, "The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining our attitude." (British White Book of 1914, No. 119.) Would Sir Edward not have been justified in making his declaration stronger?
Belgium, in the eyes of America, presents one of the most melancholy as well as one of the most heroic spectacles in modern history. Her sad plight has excited their profound sympathy. That Belgium will emerge intact and resume her national existence, Americans hope and expect. What the ultimate destiny of Belgium may be in the centuries to come is another matter which no statesman of Europe would venture to predict. But one thing may be affirmed: Belgium in the future is not going to repeat her present experience if it can be helped.
It is an error to assume that Belgium is the cause of the war of 1914 or even the cause of England's belligerency. Belgium is only one incident of the great war, not its causa causans. Many people in this country have lost sight of the fact that this war is in its origin a war for supremacy in the Balkans, which incidentally set on fire the long-conflicting pretensions of Germany and England. To the people of the Orient the present war is one for the control of the European approaches to the far East. To the average American the war is one for the principle of democracy. But whatever the object of the war, Americans in or out of public life, with ample justification, have come to believe that the triumphant success of Germany in Europe would be disastrous to America. It is not compatible with the safety of America that there should be only one great power in Europe and that power unfriendly to America. The arrogations of such a power would soon extend to this hemisphere; they would menace its integrity, and possibly destroy for centuries the national policies and the proper development of America. This is a correct, if instinctive, conclusion for Americans.
That the status of Belgium was not the primary cause of the war, history demonstrates. Belgium never has been, according to the publicists' definition, a completely sovereign state. Belgium as a state was the product of the fears of Europe. Torn away from Holland only in 1830, Belgium, by the concerted action of England and France, was erected into an independent, but neutralized, state by the convention of the five great powers convened in London in the year 1830. In the erection of a single state composed of the Flemish and the Walloon provinces, formerly a part of the United Netherlands, the racial diversities of the Flemings and the Walloons were not much considered. Consequently, the new state was from its inception left to wrestle with the always deplorable bilingual problems. The choice of a reigning house for the new kingdom was not even left to Belgium, but was dictated by the great powers. The choice of the English queen's uncle as the first sovereign was agreeable to England, and the arrangement for his speedy marriage to the daughter of Louis Philippe, then King of France, was most pleasing to France, as the future dynasty was not likely to be hostile to French susceptibilities.
It will thus be perceived that Belgium was allowed to enter the family of nations only provisionally and because the great powers deemed it the best solution of a very dangerous territorial problem. From the days of Caesar to those of Napoleon, the valley of the Meuse has been the pathway and the battle-field of all the armies of Europe. In 1830 neither France nor England was willing that either separately should have paramountcy in the territory since known as Belgium. In 1830 an English foothold in the Low Countries would have met the opposition of all the other great powers. At that time Prussia was not in a position to enforce its own views in regard to the territory now called Belgium. It very reluctantly consented to the proposals of England and France to sever it from Holland, as did Austria and Russia; but all the powers recognized that England's interest in the Belgian littoral was greatest. Indeed, her interest was vital. England has long feared that the littoral of the Low Countries might pass into powerful and unfriendly hands, and the supreme effort of her statesmen has been directed to frustrating this eventuality. That her apprehension is both legitimate and natural cannot be denied. Her bitter enemy, Napoleon the Great, discerned that "Antwerp was a pistol turned against the heart of England." What he neglected to add was that Belgian territory is a highway which leads with equal directness to either Paris or Berlin.
The terrain of both Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is very unfortunately situated as regards three of the great powers of Europe. The present German invasion of these territories is by no means the first instance of a violation by the powers; it is computed by competent authority to be the one hundred and nineteenth invasion. For this reason Belgium has been called the "Cockpit of Europe." Every military scientist in Europe has long formulated possible plans for military movements on Belgian territory, as the military archives of all the great powers might disclose.
The international situation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and of Belgium is almost identical. If anything, Luxemburg was more effectually neutralized than Belgium. A public man is in no position to form a correct opinion upon the international status of Belgium and the obligations of the guarantors of its neutralization if he is not entirely familiar with the Luxemburg neutralization treaties of 1839 and 1867, their construction by the great powers, and the subsequent attitude of the signatories to such treaties. The international status of Belgium was fixed by Articles VII and XXV of the treaties of November 15, 1831, and by Articles I and II of the treaty of April 19, 1839. The neutralization of Luxemburg was finally effected by the treaty of London, signed May 11, 1867, on the part of Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and Prussia. By Article II of that treaty the "high contracting parties engaged to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article. ,, By the prior treaty of 1839 the powers collectively guaranteed the peaceful possession of Luxemburg to the King of Holland in the fullest, most absolute, and most unqualified manner. The object of the Luxemburg treaty was to prevent the possibility of Luxemburg passing under the control of any of the great powers. The effect of the treaty of 1839 was to make Luxemburg inalienable. The English construction of her obligations under the treaty of 1839 concerning the practical neutralization of Luxemburg was not, however, fortunate for Belgium in 1914. On the threshold of the existing hostilities, as appears from that most important document, the "British White Book, ,, published in England by authority in the first days of the present war, M. Cambon, the French ambassador, asked the English foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, "what the British Government thinks of the violation of Luxemburg by the Germans." Sir Edward Grey referred him "to the views expressed in 1867 by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon." (White Book, No. 148). Sir Edward's answer involves a historical retrospect. In 1867 France, prior to the final treaty of that year, was negotiating for the acquisition of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. This expressly violated the treaty of 1839, on which Prussia relied. In Parliament Sir Robert Peel strongly protested against the purchase of Luxemburg by France, following closely the annexation of Savoy and Nice, "because the holding of Luxemburg is a matter of first importance for France, for defensive or offensive operations against Germany." The question in substance in 1867, when France was in treaty for Luxemburg, really was, What obligations the collective guarantee of the integrity of the territory of Luxemburg entailed on the signatory powers, and whether, if one power disregarded or retired from the treaty, the others were obligated either individually or jointly to enforce by arms the obligations of the treaty? Prussia insisted on the binding nature of the obligation, as it was clearly her interest to do then. Count Bismarck was firm on this point. On June 14, 1867, according to Mansard (p. 1910, seq.), Mr. Labouchère, M. P., in the course of Parliamentary debate on the treaty of 1839 said:
. . The guarantees entered into by this country for the independence of Belgium and of Turkey stood on very different ground from that given recently with respect to Luxemburg. Nobody could contend that the possession of Luxemburg, either by France or Germany, would menace or disturb our interests.
. . . . . . .At the time when a war with America seemed likely, we might have felt grateful to the Emperor of the French for stepping forward with a guarantee affecting Montreal and the Canadian lakes; but would his own subjects have been pleased?
. . . . . . .According to M. Moustier, the Foreign Minister of France, the "neutrality" of Luxemburg might not be inconsistent with the passage of troops through the Duchy. The noble Lord appeared to have admitted that a violation of the treaty would be constituted if an army marched through the territory, but a glance at the map would show that it was almost impossible that war could be waged between France and Germany without an army passing through the Luxemburg territory. If, therefore, we were to take Count Bismarck's view of our obligations, we should be bound to go to war. Nothing had done so much harm to the English name as a certain recklessness in undertaking obligations and a great discretion in fulfilling them. . . .
. . Even supposing that England might be brought to raise armies and find treasure for a war to prevent a Dutch province from becoming German or French, was it likely that our colonies would incur the risks of war for such an object?
The nature of the obligation of the powers under the Luxemburg guarantee of 1839 was in 1869 a subject of deep concern both in England and on the Continent. Prussia was particularly apprehensive. Nevertheless, Lord Stanley, then English foreign secretary, informed Prussia: "No interest of ours was either directly or indirectly involved and we stood absolutely free and unfettered. The security of Belgium is an entirely different matter." (Mansard, Vol. CLXXXVI, p. 1253, seq.)
Now, Great Britain was a party to the neutralization of Luxemburg. Lord John Russell, not then in power, alone protested against any such narrow construction of the obligation of England under the treaty of 1839, and he bravely stated that the position of the English Government had created a very unpleasant feeling on the Continent. (Mansard, Vol. CLXXXVIII, p. 975.) The relation of Saguntum to the Carthaginians was singularly like Belgium's to Germany. The Roman contentions concerning Hannibal's violation of the treaty relative to Saguntum probably offer the nearest parallel to England's present contentions concerning the German invasion of Belgium in derogation of the Belgian treaty of 1831. In the negotiations for peace the Roman argument is not likely to be overlooked by those trained in the art of diplomacy.
The attitude of the powers to the Luxemburg treaties leaves the impression that the right of a signatory to contravene or to withdraw from its conventional guaranty is not clearly denied in public law. The alleged right of a signatory to violate the pact is a grave matter, and it certainly shocks the moral sense of private people when a party to a neutralization treaty withdraws and then violates it. But the nature and extent of the obligation of a guarantor of neutrality is, in international law, not so clearly laid down as it should be. The English position that there was no obligation of the parties to the Luxemburg treaty to enforce it by a resort to arms, unless their own interests were also violated, leaves a very unpleasant impression when applied to Belgium. That a treaty of neutralization was violated with impunity in the instance of Luxemburg must be conceded, and this is the unhappy lesson of Luxemburg. The uncertainty of the attitude of the great powers in regard to neutralization treaties long stared Belgium in the face, and consequently its apprehensions were first directed to one great power and then to another. The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, with the consent of the powers, after Japan had guaranteed the independence of Korea in 1904, was ominous for Belgium.
If the often-avowed projects for the neutralization of either Mexico or Canada by the great powers ever come to maturity, America will then be confronted by a set of problems concerning neutralized countries of the gravest importance to her own internal safety and security. It is highly desirable, therefore, that the status of neutralized countries and the nature of the obligations of the guarantors of neutrality should receive a closer consideration than they yet have received in the law of nations. A neutralized state may, in some of its aspects, yet prove embarrassing for America. In late public utterances of many leading Americans regarding neutralized countries there seem to be certain assumptions quite inadmissible in respect to a Canada or a Mexico neutralized by the powers. Had the former Republic of Texas been neutralized, as once proposed, or had California been ceded to Great Britain by Mexico, as once attempted, the intricacy of the law of neutralization would now be more apparent to Americans. If the United States had joined in the proposed neutralization of the former Republic of Texas by England and France, would it then have been at liberty to recede from the treaty when Texas itself desired to be annexed to the United States? If the United States first had denounced such a treaty and declined to engage in it further, would France and England then have been obligated to enforce the neutralization of the Republic of Texas by a recourse to arms? Such are the serious questions which a treaty of neutralization presents. According to the British "White Book," on the first signs of the great conflict of 1914 Sir Edward Grey officially inquired in Paris and Berlin whether the French and German governments are "prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates if (114.) The German chancellor replied that Germany would like to know what France is prepared to do. (122).) The reply from Paris was "that the French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, unless some other power violated it."(125.) On August 1, 1914, the German ambassador at London asked Sir Edward Grey whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, England would engage to remain neutral. Sir Edward Grey did not think "we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone." (123.) The German ambassador then suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed by Germany. No definite reply was vouchsafed. England simply refused to be bound. Evidently the great war of the empires, long predicted, was at hand, if all the conditions favored it. In that event Belgium was left in a very perilous position, for every military expert in Europe had announced that its territory would inevitably be a battlefield of the warring powers.