CHAPTER IV
THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR
When the present Great War shall have subsided, how will America stand in relation to the rest of the world? In what way will her peculiar interests be affected by the possible international arrangements which will in the usual course conclude the war? These are now questions of more than ordinary moment to the future peace and prosperity of America. No doubt the questions themselves are receiving the anxious consideration of the present Government.
The interests of America most concerned in the final treaties which will embody the consummation of this greatest of modern wars may be classified as (1) Mexican, (2) Canadian, (3) West Indian, (4) Asiatic, and Pacific. Cursory suggestions in regard to each of these interests are contained in these articles. It is not pretended that they are other than tentative; but it is thought that at this important moment the suggestions, such as they are, may serve to stimulate their better discussion.
To some extent the interests indicated must be affected by the outcome of the present World War. That at the end of the war the alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire will not be disrupted is most probable. It is a natural alliance dictated by the interests of the German Empire, Austria, and Turkey. The alliance ought not to be regarded as offensive to America. Nor is its continuation hostile to the best interests of America, for in that event France, England, Italy, and Japan of the great powers will necessarily be interested to remain in very close and friendly association with America. An alliance of the Central powers will make the continuation of the "Entente" highly desirable for England, France, Italy, Japan, and America. There will thus be a new and more effective "balance" of the great powers. Such an association of the great powers must tend to the advantage of America, for it conduces to a more satisfactory solution of the pressing Mexican and Japanese problems in particular.
At the moment it looks as if Russia would usurp the place of the Balkans in the chancelleries of Europe. If Russia remains intact, and a stable government of all the Russias comes soon, that Russia will for the time being adhere most closely to France and America seems probable. But the Russian situation is not reassuring. That a permanent form of government is likely to arise in Russia within a decade is not probable unless the monarchy is meanwhile restored.
What, then, is to become of the vast Russian domain in the event of more serious internal commotions is with reason troubling every statesman in every state in Europe. For a long time to come the final destiny of Russia and her Asiatic provinces must necessarily continue to usurp the most important place in the diplomacy of Europe. If Russia should by any means drift back to her former dynasty, it will apparently be under a modified and more liberal constitution. That disorder and insecurity of property will be allowed to continue in Russia is most improbable. In time the property classes and the intelligent nobility of Russia will doubtless make some overt effort looking to a reaction and the restoration of the ancient and historic monarchy. Should the monarchy be restored with the consent of the Russians, America will have little to apprehend. The ancient dynasty of Russia has exhibited the greatest friendliness to America and in the most critical moments of American history. It is to this friendship that America owes the princely domain of Alaska and its dependencies. It was not advantageous to Canada or the English interests that Alaska should pass to America, but the Russian dynasty ignored their opposition and ceded Alaska to America. Such friendly generosity on the part of the late dynasty and its conduct in the civil war of 1861-65 Americans are not likely to forget when the American problems to the north of the 49th degree of north latitude become more critical, as they necessarily will with time.
America is not interested in imposing any particular form of government on Russia. With the internal government of any country in Europe America has no concern so long as American institutions are not menaced by that country. America has no interest in the forms of government adopted by European countries. Lloyd George, who stands preeminently for the democracy of England, has very recently stated that such was the English position concerning the domestic institutions of all foreign countries. Mr. Balfour, who is personally a representative of a very different class of Englishmen, the professional governing aristocracy of England, in July of last year officially stated that "no one was foolish enough to suppose that it would be possible to impose" on a foreign country "a constitution made outside of that country." He very properly added that "nations must make their scheme of liberty for themselves according to their own ideas and based on their history, character, and hopes."
This statement has much commended itself to the intelligence of most thoughtful Americans. America has now nothing to fear from Germany so long as England, France, Italy, and Japan are not estranged.
The present entente between France and England is likely to be durable. As the French ambassador, M. Cambon, said in London to Sir Edward Grey, in July, 1914: "It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. Great Britain would then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 Great Britain had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength. . . ." (119.) That France should continue an independent and undiminished state has now become important to English security. The safety of both powers is seen to depend in the future upon their entente. Had Russia, by means of this war, assumed the hegemony of Europe, and had France continued in close alliance with her on all Eastern questions, the English understanding with France might speedily have been jeoparded; but no such condition is now likely to ensue within any reasonable space of time. Therefore the continued entente between France and England is measurably sure to endure for a considerable space after this present war is terminated.
The future position of Russia is admitted in Europe to be uncertain. That Russia will be reconstructed ultimately on the ancient plan and in conformity with the principles of the governments most nearly adjacent to her is generally regarded in Europe as the most natural solution. In Asia the future of Russia excites apprehension. Japan would have ground for alarm if the naturally strong, disciplined, and effectual German system were by any chance extended to the Pacific. Japan is therefore directly interested at present in preserving a good understanding with all the Entente powers, including America. That this entente cordiale will conduce to the interests of America is apparent. It can be destroyed only by the improbable disruption of the alliance between the Central powers of Europe.
The problems of America after the war will not be confined to foreign affairs. The inevitable increase in taxation by the Federal Government, the probable rapid diminution in the remuneration of labor, and the increased cost of living due to the war will doubtless create popular unrest such as has never before been known in America. That the Government will prove equal to the maintenance of order there is no reason from its past history to doubt. The attachment of Americans to their familiar institutions is so great that mere adversity or misfortune alone will not cause them to change their institutions. The perpetuation of the republic in America is for a long period as certain as any human institution of government can be, but the need for fostering the interests already indicated will be made apparent to the Government when the period of unrest becomes acute.