CHAPTER III
THE BALKANS
That the War of 1914 could be confined to the Balkans no profound English statesman could have believed; yet the early efforts of both England and Germany in 1914 were apparently directed to that end alone. Had the war been so confined, it would have been satisfactory only to Austria-Hungary. It must have been known in England from the first menace of hostilities against Serbia by Austria-Hungary that in any such conflict Serbia would not be abandoned by Russia. The Balkan history of the last half of the century preceding demonstrated that Russia could not abandon the Slavs to Austrian domination. That Germany would stand by Austria-Hungary as against Russia was equally clear. The French ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg most frankly stated "that France would adhere to Russia at every step." (White Book, No. 6.) The only possibility of preventing the extension of the Balkan war to all Europe was that England should promptly declare its intention to stand with France and Russia in the event of a European war. If England so declared, she was advised by Russia, France, and Italy that a general European war involving all the great powers could be avoided. This is proved by the official documents contained in the British White Book of 1914. The Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonoff, in July, 1914, stated to the English representative in St. Petersburg that if England "took her stand with France and Russia, there would be no war," but that if England "failed them now, rivers of blood would flow," and England "would in the end be dragged in." (No. 17.) On July 27 the Russian ambassador in London deplored the effect of the impression that England would stand aside. (No. 47.) M. Paléologue, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, urged England to the same effect. On July 29 the Marquis of San Giuliani gave to the British ambassador Italy's opinion, "If Germany believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, it would have a great effect." (No. 80.) President Poincaré in behalf of France, on July 30, 1914, stated to the British ambassador at Paris, "if his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the result of a conflict . . there would be no war." (No. 99.) President Poincaré reiterated this in his letter to King George V of England, dated July 31, 1914. But England did not, or could not for some reason, act. It seems now as if a titanic struggle in Europe was fated by errors of policy from the beginning, and that it was beyond the powers of the statesmen of any single country to prevent the dire calamity. The apprehensions, the fears, and the rival ambitions of the nations of Europe all tended to make a general war inevitable when the Balkan fires were relighted in 1914.
The preliminary transactions between the powers in July and August, 1914, when the war between Austria and Serbia loomed up, are contained in the British White Book. On July 24, 1914, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg gave the British ambassador to understand "that France would fulfill all their obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. ,, (No. 6.) On July 29, 1914, Sir Edward Grey communicated to Sir Francis Bertie in Paris that the Balkan war "would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question."(No. 87.) The British ambassador at St. Petersburg had previously stated to the French ambassador that "direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. ,, (No. 6.)
That the British interests in the Balkans were not "nil," England knew, and it is now apparent to the world that English interests in Serbia are not nil. Had Russia been triumphant and Austria-Hungary effaced, a great Slav power under the hegemony of Russia would have been erected in the Balkans. This would have been most disturbing to English susceptibilities, and to Great Britain's interests in Asia and Africa. Since the war began it has been correctly stated in England by an English subject, who has devoted much critical attention to the "Eastern questions," that in the event of Russia's triumph in the Balkans English imperialists would have been obliged to promote the military strength of the German Empire as a counterpoise to the dreaded Russian ascendency. Now that the Central powers are for the moment in practical control of the Balkans, the danger of the Balkans to English interests is no longer concealed in England. The Balkan question is, in fact, an ominous spectre in all intelligent governmental circles in England, for in it are involved many future perils to the different powers, but most directly of all to the extended English Empire.
The Austria-Hungary war of 1914 against Serbia was "the postponed sequel of the war of 1912/ ■ That Germany would aid Austria against Russia was certain. Ever since the days of Frederick II of Prussia the inhabitants of Germany have been in fear of Russian invasion. It was to prevent the overweening growth of Russia that occasioned the first partition of Poland. It was a national fear of Russia in Germany which in the end mobilized even the Social Democrats behind German diplomacy in the present Great War, (English "Contemporary Review" for September, 1914).
The Balkan question is not complicated . When the Ottoman Empire had been virtually destroyed in Europe, the Balkan question became primarily an issue between Austria and Russia for the hegemony of the small States through which led most directly the land passages from Europe to Asia, Africa, and the seas adjacent. For a time Russia and Austria worked in close association in the Balkans. Austria was allowed predominance in Serbia and Russia in Bulgaria. It was when Russian diplomacy became most influential in Serbia also that the general European peace was first threatened.
At this fateful epoch in the world's history the most immediate of all the problems of the moment is, What will become of Russia, Turkey, and the Balkans? The interest of America in this question is not direct. That the Balkan questions should be intruded at all into American policies is highly undesirable. There are indications that there is already a rift in the entente between America and England on this point. Mr. Balfour significantly announced to Parliament, July 29 of last year, "America had [has] no interest on the Continent" of Europe. This announcement is apparently not in accord with late official declarations at Washington, nor is it consistent with all the causes officially assigned for Americans entrance into the European War.
With proper regard to the future safety of the United States, it cannot be conceded that it is the policy of the United States to promote the proposed neutralization of any of the Balkan States, under some guaranty by the great powers, to be contained in the final treaty of peace which will terminate the present general war. The United States has no national interest in the Balkans. Even if the Balkan States should urge the United States to become a party to their neutralization, it is to he hoped that it will decline.
The proximity of a feeble power to a great one makes neutralization guaranties highly coveted in the weaker state. For this reason it has been suggested that Canada and Mexico should ultimately be neutralized by international guaranties of the great powers. That any such neutralization of Canada or Mexico would be inimical to the interests of America in any future war between the United States and a great European or a great Asiatic power, military men will concede. In any such war it would be indispensable to the security of America that its military forces should immediately bar any approach to this continent through the open doors of either Canada or Mexico. While Americans prize liberty in the abstract, the first care of their Government should be the liberty of Americans, and not that of some remote people alien to them in blood and institutions. It was some such reason in all probability which induced the astute English statesmen to refrain from taking a final position in regard to the true construction of the Luxemburg treaties already mentioned.