First World War Centennial

CHAPTER VI

CONVOY

VERY little has been said in connection with the complications caused neutral shipping by British Orders in Council, about convoy. Why? Perhaps because the un­usual blockade now being enforced against the central Powers of Europe comprehends the shutting off of enemy exports through neutral countries as well as imports, and makes such a provision embarrassing. For while it is possible that convoy might be arranged in the interest of merchant fleets sailing from neutral ports that are within the British zone, the matter would be a diffi­cult one, and precedents are not available. However this may be, it cannot be denied that if the use of convoy (whether lim­ited or not) can be made to modify any phase of a trying situation, it should be introduced.

No neutral is going to take up arms against Great Britain until it is better satisfied that her theory of blockade is as indefensible as it is now believed to be. Meantime and during the exchange of diplomatic notes, it is conceivable that effort may properly and advantageously be made along the line of providing men-of-war as escorts, and other­wise, to eliminate causes of friction which are arising as a result of that blockade.

One of these causes is the transshipment of cargoes so that goods consigned by a neutral to a neutral reach a belligerent. The British ministry, with a color of right because of the law laid down by United States as well as British courts, and because the neutral countries next adjacent to Germany are piling up supplies until they have reached a bulk far beyond their domestic needs, is interfering with neutral intercourse. They plead that if they failed to do this, their blockade would be ineffective, and that the surplusage of the merchandise delivered in Denmark, Holland, and Scandinavia has an enemy destination.

To their argument an exporting neutral may well reply: "We admit that you are not altogether without grounds for your sus­picions; meantime your practice, aside from your inadmissible theories of blockade and contraband, constitutes a real grievance to a friendly Power. We therefore propose here­after to send ships in the North Sea trade under convoy of war vessels, admitting none to the protected fleet except carriers whose trade is legitimate."

It is submitted that such a communication, properly followed up, even if it failed to bring a favorable reply, would leave his Britannic Majesty without further excuse for meddling with such trading between neutrals as is usual and proper. This is because even British statesmen, with their traditions of ocean overlordship, must recognize the fact that the guaranty of a neutral government cannot be gainsaid with­out offense more serious than the difficulty they are trying to meet. They have already gone on record in the London Convention in favor of such practice—a mighty concession—and know that those who advocate it are thinking clearly and logically. Therefore even should they claim that the London Con­vention was inoperative, they could hardly by so doing escape the charge of being disin­genuous and unfair.

Whether or not such a proposition on behalf of a neutral during the present war is feasible or desirable, depends upon facts which are not apparent to the unofficial observer. Meantime no discussion of neutral rights and duties ought to overlook reference to a custom that through neutral persistence promises to harden into law.

It was in 1653 that Sweden, in a similar predicament, because of war between the Netherlands and Great Britain, to that in which she now finds herself, urged that belligerents should waive rights of visitation in case of convoy, provided the commander of the latter gave proper guaranties. Sweden was on safe ground although the peace of Westminster made it unnecessary to pursue the matter at that time. She was claiming something inherent in her as a sovereignty, viz., a right to officially administer and say the final word in regard to her own subjects and their belongings when on the high seas, and particularly when under the guns of a government ship. Whether or not she carried conviction to other cabinets at the time is doubtful, but it is a most interesting fact that the Netherlands, involved as a belligerent in 1653 but a neutral in 1756, was pushing the same contention a hundred years later. This indicates that the latter country was impressed. Indeed evidence of this is cumulative, for in 1781 the Nether­lands, again fighting with Great Britain, made it a point to give convoy full belligerent recognition. By this time "convoy" was no longer a new proposition for the avoidance of ruthless visitation and search.

Prior to 1800, treaties recognizing the

Prior to authority of a warship convoying ordinary carriers had been signed by the United States and all of the great Powers now at war except Great Britain and Italy, and the practice was well under way toward receiv­ing the standing in international law which belongs to it. Great Britain, however, was not complaisant, and her concessions were so grudgingly given as to discourage continental critics. Indeed, if it had not been for the Naval Conference at London in 1908-9, it is probable that she would still be in the position of a dissenter and obstructionist.

The struggle over the inviolability of a convoyed merchantman is synchronous with the slow emergence of neutrals as sovereign-ties having a part in the progress of the nations. As the law now stands, if we regard the unratified London Convention as most nearly summarizing the best thought of the hour, as well as reflecting the weight of authority in regard to maritime affairs, neu­tral vessels are immune when under convoy. Great Britain may undoubtedly claim that she is not acquiescent because of the infor­mality of the London agreement. This does not seem probable. If it were, neutral nations should refuse to relax a rule which has been sufficiently endorsed and which is based on a reasonable theory. The time has gone by when a neutral merchantman can be cut out with warrant from under the guns of a government ship. Let the belligerent com­mander harbor such suspicions as he may, there is no overruling the decision or report, of the captain of the protecting war vessel except by referring the matter to the bel­ligerent government concerned. This may take such action as it pleases. That is a secondary condition. The significant fact is that with the shifting of the issue from the high seas to the cabinet, unjustifiable usurpa­tion of authority is discouraged and the rights of sovereignty vindicated.

Convoy was once a phrase that was not unfamiliar in maritime countries. It has fallen into disuse. Whether or not war conditions will bring it into the fore again remains to be seen. Meanwhile reference to the custom is of value for two reasons:

(i) The reader can hardly select an inter­national question of moment which better illustrates the manner in which neutral Powers have laboriously but successfully pushed their claims upon the attention of warring nations; (2) the claim that a convoy­ing warship represents its government for the purpose of the moment is a formal demand for the recognition of sovereignty in the great spaces of the globe which are not subject to dominion. As such it suggests an era which may not be as distant as pessimists insist, when the neutral merchant vessel, outside home and belligerent waters alike, and still on the high seas, shall be regarded as a part of the country from which it sailed, and free, except for international police surveillance, to control its own movements.

Not so many years gone by Great Britain, as alleged mistress of the seas, did not hesitate to visit and search a neutral warship. She has made great concessions in the interest of international law since those days. Whether or not she will make more in the near future depends both upon the wisdom and firmness of the United States and other neutral gov­ernments, and the consistency of the great countries with which she has joined battle.