CHAPTER II
NATIONAL DEFENCE AND A CITIZEN ARMY
JUST before the war broke out two very important books were published in France, L'Armée Nouvelle, by Jaurès, and Faites un Roi sinon Faites la Paix, by Marcel Sembat, now a member of the French Cabinet. Jaurès' book—very lengthy and somewhat prolix—contained an extraordinarily fresh exposition of military tactics and organization based upon three propositions:—
1 that the army should be a citizen force;
2. that its tactics should be those of defence, not offence; and
3. that only when the army is a citizen force can the policy of the country be defensive.
The way in which many of the ideas explained in the book seemed to have anticipated what actually happened in the war drew great attention to it, and an abstract of it has been published in English for the purpose of inducing Labour in particular to accept the National Service which it advocates for France.1 1Published under the title of Democracy and Military Service
Jaurès' position regarding Great Britain, however, must not be misunderstood. I have had many conversations with him on the subject, and he never expressed to me the view that what was best for France was also best for England. At International Socialist Congresses, when military discussions were on, he always excluded England from his proposals. L'Armée Nouvelle was addressed to France and to countries with large standing armies and continental frontiers. His references to Great Britain in the book are of a special kind.2 2Pp. 496-515. He describes the Lord Haldane reorganization of the Army, and considers that unless European policy changes it is only a transition form, and that a militia system must finally be evolved. He discusses the National Service League's proposals of universal service and suspects them. "If I were to speak quite candidly," he says,3 3P. 512. "I do not believe that peace is the chief consideration of Lord Curzon and his friends." They would not be sorry if something so upset the minds of the British people that they would plunge into war. He regards the whole movement h£re as an Imperialist and aggressive one. "It is an effort to capture for political Imperialism the forces of democracy."1 1Pp. 512-13. More specifically he points out that Great Britain has an alternative:—
In any case I repeat that England must either aid the movement to inaugurate a new policy which will result in agreements to disarm, and which will dissipate the nightmares of war and invasion, or accept universal service by the force of events, by the implacable logic of an armed peace, and by the dull fever of an Anglo-German conflict.2 2P. 514.
The meaning of this is quite clear. Juarès hoped that we would pursue a peace policy, and keep out of the politics and antagonisms which compelled the rest of Europe to resort to universal military service, whilst being perfectly convinced that if we did not do that the implacable logic of events would drive us into a militia system. The author of L'Armée Nouvelle did not wish us to adopt his system except as a last resort, and after we had failed to pursue the political policy which he advocated and which he believed was open to us.
The book which his friend and colleague, Sembat, Wrote was the political supplement to L'Armée Nouvelle. In a sentence its contention is that political policy—not war preparations—not military organization, determines peace and war; that if nations have to trust for their defence to arms during peace they create, not only an undemocratic spirit amongst their people, but must also adopt a national organization other than democratic: "Make a King or make Peace." This is the evolution which is inevitable, and from that point of view he criticized adversely the Entente ,and the policy of France.
In these books we have two great Frenchmen, both devoted friends of peace, discussing from different angles the problems of peace. "Create a peace army," says the one, "because European policy threatens you, and you must defend yourself." "Create a. peace policy," says the other, "because militarism threatens the very State which it is called in to aid."
Between these two magnets of fear and reason the peace sentiment swings. It creates an army to defend itself, and it supplements its military efforts by diplomatic alliances; at the same time it sighs for a policy which will remove dangers and make military precautions unnecessary. Here is the fix in which nations are; and the question which very few people consider, but which long experience thrusts upon us is, Can a nation swinging between these two policies ever have peace? Can a Juarès ever assist to write history as both he and Sembat would like it to be written?
I think not, and I believe the reason to be as plain as any reason ever can be.
One of several unreal distinctions which Juarès makes is that if the army is a citizen force, such a force would be more pacific and less un4etf the control of diplomatists and aggressive military sections than a barrack army or a hired one. In other Words, he argues that a citizen army is a peace army, and that statesmen can use it only for defence because it will not tolerate a war of aggression. That is not true. The argument was a familiar one at International Congresses, but this war has disproved it. No people even make war, whether they have to fight themselves or only pay others to fight for them. But having said that, we have said nothing of any value or importance. There was little difference in the way that the people of Great Britain, France, and Germany leaped to the sword in the autumn of 1914, and if there was any difference in the policies of the various Governments during the negotiations which preceded the war, it was the Government with the voluntary and the hired Army, which hesitated most, the Government which believed that it would only have to supply a few hundred thousand men to do its share of the fighting. If there was any difference in the popular desire for peace during the last ten years, not one can say that the British people, who did not expect to have to fight a a whole, were more bellicose than either the French or the Germans. Indeed, what happened rather proves that the more general the military service is, the more readily the people (accept the military assumption that war cannot be avoided, the more do they become accustomed to take it for granted that soldiers will be used to settle international quarrels. Nor is there anything in the argument that if people have to fight themselves they will be more careful to see that the sword is only the last resort. Whether they fight or only pay, their Governments have to persuade them that they have justice and righteousness on their side, and that they are defending themselves and not transgressing on other people's rights. It was a nation that Napoleon led to threaten Europe, and not a hired or a barrack army. Jaurès for a moment forgot his French history. On the other find, when people know that they themselves have to fight, they more readily accept doctrines of "military, necessity." The military argument that Belgium had to be used as a highway in order to save the lives of German soldiers was listened to more readily by Germans because the whole nation was liable to be called out than if only 4 per cent. of it had been soldiers.
Further, Jaurès simplified his categories of war when he assumed they were either offensive or defensive. They may also be casual in the sense that they have arisen out of general policy and represent a conflict in ideas or purpose. iWars in these modern days are most likely to come like the harvest of fate in a Greek tragedy. A mistake is made, an evil is done, and the innocent are dragged in to wipe out the stain with their blood. (Whether the army is voluntary and hired for citizen and conscript will make no difference in that quarrel. If there is an army there will then be a fight.
Therefore, when Jaurès says that "a nation in aims is necessarily a nation actuated by justice and uprightness," and that in consequence it will only (engage in wars of defence or of liberty, he is slaying what is not true, and is using high-sounding words which mislead people. Whether a nation is trained in arms or trusts in a voluntary, army, its rulers are under the same necessity to gain 'public opinion and passion in support of war, and the former nation presents fewer difficulties to such rulers than the latter. A nation in arms thinks more in camps, and obeys involuntarily the impulses of militarism more readily than does a nation not in arms. If this argument is sound, practically the whole of the ground upon which L'Armée Nouvelle rests is knocked away.
This is of special importance to Labour. Under the promise that a citizen force is a peace force Labour is being invited to support national compulsion. The only result will be that the citizen Army will teach obedience and military necessity to the people, and cripple their initiative and independence, and rob their political strength of authority as it did in the case of the German Social Democrats. Universal military training does not raise any barrier of public opinion against war; it only tends to make all public opinion pliable to authority.