First World War CentennialFirst World War Centennial

Chapter II: Montenegro; the crime of the Peace conference

II.

In the World War

MONTENEGRO is a small state on the map. So is Belgium, which has been exalted to heaven and her recovery hastened in every way—as it should be; while a perfidious power has been permitted to drive an indomitable race of free men up into the clefts of the Black Moun­tains. The very rocks are kinder to the Monte­negrins than their Serbian neighbors, men of their own blood.

Without making a single condition, Monte­negro entered the war on the side of the Allies and particularly in aid of Serbia. At the first hint of trouble, Premier Pachitch telegraphed to the Montenegrin Government to find where it stood. In three hours a reply came to Belgrade, containing these words:

"In any event, Montenegro will share, today as always, good and ill with Serbia. Your fate shall be ours!" The date of that dispatch was July 24, 1914. On the same day, Serbia wired the definite question:

"Can Serbia count upon the fraternal and un­limited assistance of Montenegro in case of con­flict with Austria Hungary?" On the following day, this reply was returned to Belgrade:

"Serbia may count on the unlimited fraternal help of Montenegro in this critical moment for those of Serbian blood as well as at any other time."

Note that this positive declaration was made before Russia or the other great nations had be­come Serbia's allies.

And when the Crown Prince Alexander thanked his grandfather for this generous offer, the old King followed up the first message with this ringing statement of fact:

"My Montenegrins are already at the border, ready to die for the defense of the Sacred Common Cause." All of his mountaineers from 18 to 61 years of age were mobilized at once.

Are these the words or the acts of a King who could ever betray his friends as Nicolas was accused of doing by those whose interest lay in the success of another dynasty?

Montenegro entered the world war without a shadow of compulsion. She had neither treaty nor convention with any power that could en­tangle her against her will. Except for geographi­cal position, she was as free as the United States.

But her people as well as her government were incapable of remaining inactive.

Montenegro could have urged certain ancient claims to surrounding territory as the price of her support. She asked nothing, she waited for nothing.

"Fight first, bargain afterward," was her charac­teristic gesture. Austria knew the valor of this foe and offered a bribe of territory, which was refused.

The army was poorly equipped. And unlike the armies of other nations it had no rich re­sources to draw upon. In recent years it had suffered heavy losses, including that of 10,000 men at Scutari.

Yet Austria, judging by man quality more than numbers or supplies, sent as large a force as against the Serbs. The Allies were too much occupied elsewhere to give help, as they had promised.

The simple unquestioned facts relating to King Nicolas draw the teeth of the charges brought against him. It was said that he gave up the fight too soon. The fact is that his army was wholly under Serbian military authorities. It had actually done superb service in covering the re­treat of the many times larger Serbian force. Where the main body could not stand against the enemy, how could the little Montenegrin de­tachment be asked to do so?

On December 29th, 1915, Premier Pachitch and Col. Pechitch, both of Serbia, went to the King and urged that he make a truce with Austria. He protested but finally said, in sub­stance:

"One of you is responsible for the politics, the other for the army; if you ask for an armistice it will be solely and entirely upon your own personal responsibility."

On January 13, 1916, Col. Pierre Pechitch, Ser­bian commander of the Montenegrin troops wrote to King Nicolas:

"All the heads of the army on the west front declare that such demoralization is manifest in our army that resistance to the enemy is abso­lutely impossible.

"The Cattaro division is completely scattered and practically non-existent.

"The commanders of the Cattaro and Lovtchen divisions have not a single cannon. The army is starving; it has few munitions, there being no hope of changing that state of affairs.

"Showing you in its reality the state of the army, I have the honor of calling to the attention of your Majesty the absolute impossibility under such conditions of going on with the struggle."

Col. Pechitch thereupon urges the King to make peace and to withdraw for the present from Montenegro.

Nobody ever accused Clemenceau of having any special prejudice in the case or of being re­tained to plead for Nicolas. But this is what he printed in L'Homme Enchainé, January 1916:

"Italy is taking no pains to defend Mount Lovtchen, which is necessary to the existence of our friend Montenegro and which would be, in the hands of the Austrians, a powerful menace to the freedom of the Adriatic in the feeding of the Serbian army now in the worst extremity of misfortune."

And then the old tiger adds, with the irony for which he is famous:

"Mount Lovtchen, abundantly provided with prehistoric artillery, calmly waits for some one to come and take it."

Yet Nicolas was accused of giving up Mount Lovtchen secretly to the Austrians. The cowardly enemies of the King never had a case which they dared present in the open court of public opinion. And the Mount Lovtchen lie is one of the most foolish of all, since there is not a fact on record that would help to render it plausible. Before the historic height was surrendered, the King had turned over to the Serbians all active con­trol of his army.

Having fought to the last cartridge, the devoted army saw disaster at hand. The entire govern­ment had moved to France, except the minister of war. He withdrew into the mountains to or­ganize a guerilla campaign.

So effectively was this carried out that the Austrian military governor resorted to an ex­treme measure, which Asquith characterized as the worst single crime of the war.

A notice was posted throughout Montenegro to this effect: The minister of war must appear to treat for peace in three days. Upon his failure to do so, his father, over 80 years of age, and his brother, were to be hung.

As soon as they heard the condition, both father and brother sent word to the minister, "Do not return. It is better for us to die than for Montenegro to yield." Between the call of affec­tion and the plain course of his duty, Gen. Vessovitch made the choice his family and the nation counted on him to make. He stayed at his post.

The proposed murder of an innocent old man was too shocking to be carried through. Fran­cis Joseph, another old man whose tragic career was soon to end, "pardoned" the father. The brother however, was killed according to the pro­gram. Nobody has ever been punished for this medieval method of striking an enemy that could not be overcome in battle.